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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, 
incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these 
issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which 
have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, 
which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and 
philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include 
certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking 
at how we actually use words in particular contexts. When we get clear about which 
language game we are playing, these topics are seen to be ordinary scientific and 
mathematical questions like any others. Wittgenstein’s insights have seldom been 
equaled and never surpassed and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years ago 
when he dictated the Blue and Brown Books. In spite of its failings—really a series 
of notes rather than a finished book—this is a unique source of the work of these 
three famous scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, 
math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by 
Wolpert (see below or my articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The 
Outer Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on universal computation, and among his 
many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
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In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—this is a 
unique source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been working 
at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a century. Da 
Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my articles on Wolpert and my 
review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on universal 
computation, and among his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in 
paraconsistency. 
 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s results are 
a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous mathematical 
results in the last 50 years and he has documented them in many books and articles. 
His coauthors from Brazil are less well known in spite of their many important 
contributions. For all the topics here, the best way to get free articles and books on 
the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, 
philpapers.org, libgen.io or b-ok.org, where there are millions of 
preprints/articles/books on every topic (be warned this may use up all your spare 
time for the rest of your life!). 
 
As readers of my other articles are aware, in my view there are two basic issues 
running throughout philosophy and science which have completely different 
solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the 
world that need to be investigated observationally, and philosophical issues as to 
how language can be used intelligibly, which need to be decided by looking at how 
we actually use certain words in particular contexts and how these are extended to 
new uses in new contexts. Unfortunately, there is almost no awareness that these 
are two different tasks and so this work, like all scientific writing that has a 
‘philosophical’ aspect, mixes the two with unfortunate results. And then there is 
scientism, which we can here take as the attempt to treat all issues as scientific ones 
and reductionism which tries to treat them as physics and/or mathematics. Since I 
have noted in my reviews of books by Wittgenstein (W), Searle and others, how an 
understanding of the language used in what Searle calls the Logical Structure of 
Reality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT), along with the Dual Process Fremework (the Two Systems of Thought) 
helps to clarify philosophical problems, I will not repeat the reasons for that view 
here. 
 
Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic 
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randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our 
symbolic systems that may result in public testable actions-i.e., if meaningful it has 
COS), it seems inescapable that thinking (dispositional behavior having COS) is full 
of impossible, random or incomplete statements and situations. Since we can view 
each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our 
psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not 
“complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (another group of language 
games) shows there are limitless theorems that are ‘true’ but unprovable—i.e., ‘true’ 
for no ‘reason’. One should then be able to say that there are limitless statements 
that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations 
attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s 
views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his 
work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of 
language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the 
best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and 
so to philosophy. 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and full 
of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., they have 
no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable that 
everything derived from it by using higher order thought (system 2 or S2) to extend 
our innate axiomatic psychology (System 1 or S1) into complex social interactions 
such as games, economics, physics and math, will be “incomplete” also. 
 
The first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory 
(which are continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and philosophy) was 
the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 63 years ago, and there have been many 
since such as the recent impossibility or incompleteness proof by Brandenburger 
and Kreisel (2006) in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that 
what lookslike a simple choice stated in plain English has no solution. There are 
also many famous “paradoxes” such as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by Rupert 
Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where what 
seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it proves 
exceptionally hard to find. A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two 
“incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that W’s 
writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, 
Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful work in 
explaining W, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the 
language games being played in mathematics and logic have been clarified by Floyd 
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(e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto 
(e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons’ , and ‘Wittgenstein on 
Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ , and Rodych ( e.g., ‘Wittgenstein and 
Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’ and ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New 
Arguments about Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein’). Berto is one of 
the best recent philosophers, and those with time might wish to consult his many 
other articles and books including the volume he co- edited on paraconsistency. 
Rodych’s work is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online 
(but see b-ok.org and also his online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles). 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use by 
Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for W’s “notorious” 
interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept W’s argument, I 
think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and 
meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words) as metamathematics, 
undecidability and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and even claimed by no 
less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths about our 
mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about how language 
works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical 
notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions a la Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchland’s 
etc.), they have no practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within 
this framework, it is not possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be 
expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and demonstrably true (under 
the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the meta-system). 
If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved 
sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with 
the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different 
system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a formal 
system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal 
system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs 
establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete 
systems, just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent 
arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are 
nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such theories 
match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their 
inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from 
Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and 
decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which 
there cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability 
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of paraconsistent arithmetics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained 
thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our 
behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of 
pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an 
unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that 
mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that 
is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W commented many times that ‘truth’ in math 
means axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one 
made a mistake in using the definitions (from which results follow necessarily and 
algorithmically), and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one 
applies a test (the results of which are unpredictable and debatable). W often noted 
that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other 
proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s 
Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano 
Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, 
unlike all the ‘rest’ of Peano Arithmetic, it cannot be used in the real world either. 
As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-
systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary 
counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs 
a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, 
‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created 
with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this 
warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there 
is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, 
everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, being 
misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and makes many other 
penetrating comments (see Rodych and Floyd). Of course, the same remarks apply 
to all forms of logic and any other symbolic system. 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, W 
was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility of 
inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments about 
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W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many others were 
misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against W. Some may feel we 
have strayed off the path here—after all in ‘Godel’s Way’ we only want to 
understand ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ (in quotes because part of the problem is 
regarding them as ‘systems’) and why these ‘paradoxes’ and ‘inconsistencies’ arise 
and how to dispose of them. But I claim that is exactly what I have done by pointing 
to the work of W. Our symbolic systems (language, math, logic, computation) have 
a clear use in the narrow confines of everyday life, in what we can loosely call the 
mesoscopic realm--the space and time of normal events we can observe unaided 
and with certainty (the innate axiomatic bedrock or background as W and later 
Searle call it). But we leave coherence behind when we enter the realms of particle 
physics or the cosmos, relativity, math beyond simple addition and subtraction 
with whole numbers, and language used out of the immediate context of everyday 
events. The words or whole sentences may be the same, but the meaning is lost (i.e., 
to use Searle’s preferred term, their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) are changed or 
opaque). It looks to me like the best way to understand philosophy may be to enter 
it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on W, so as to understand the subtleties of 
language as it is used in math and thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds may 
be dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, 
bringing it back down to the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic 
command- aspect of Turing’s metaphors.” 
 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) where 
it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, “number” 
,”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS context), and 
hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise for Chaitin’s 
“algorithmic randomness”. As W noted frequently, do the “inconsistencies” of 
math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics cause any real problems in 
math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases of contradictory statements 
–e.g., in set theory---have long been known but math goes on anyway. Likewise for 
the countless liar (self-referencing) paradoxes in language and in the 
”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” (groups of complex LG’s) of mathematics as 
well. 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different LG’s 
(meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle” “object” , ”inside”, “outside”, 
“next”, “simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” ,”question”, “answer” 
,“infinite”, “past”, “future”, “problem”, “logic”, “ontology”, “epistemology”, 
“solution”, “paradox”,“prove”, “strange”, “normal”, “experiment”, ”complete”, 
“uncountable”, “decidable”, “dimension”, “complete”, “formula”, “process”, 
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“algorithm”, “axiom”, ”mathematics”, “number”, “physics”, “cause”, “place”, 
“same”,“moving”, “limit”, “reason”, “still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, 
“event”, ”recursive”, “meta—“, “self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, 
“sentence” and even (in some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, 
“if…then”, “follows” etc. 
 
As W noted, most of what people (including many philosophers and most 
scientists) have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw material. 
Chaitin, Doria, and Da Costa join Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, 
Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in repeating the mistakes of the 
Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with science. I suggest quick 
antidotes via my reviews and some Rupert Read such as his books ‘A 
Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the Sciences’, or 
go to academia.edu and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and 
‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of Searle as feasible, but at least his most 
recent such as ‘Philosophy in a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese 
Philosophy’, ‘Making the Social World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or at 
least my reviews) and his recent volume on perception. There are also over 100 
youtubes of Searle, which confirm his reputation as the best standup philosopher 
since Wittgenstein. 
 
A major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between game theorists, 
physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, 
all of whom have been publishing for decades closely related proofs of 
undecidability, impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the 
more bizarre is the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state 
formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game between the 
universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the Born 
rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an 
impossibility result and (until Chaitin and above all Wolpert— see my article on his 
work) it is the most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent), but there have been an 
avalanche of others. As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was the famous 
General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for 
which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are 
now Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no 
reasonably consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating 
individuals’ preferences into group preferences) can give sensible results. The 
group is either dominated by one person and so GIT is often called the “dictator 
theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was titled 
"A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like this:” It is 
 8 
 
impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; 
Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar 
with modern decision theory accept this and the many related constraining 
theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it (and all these 
theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career path that has 
nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow Impossibility 
Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) among legions of 
publications. 
 
Another recent famous impossibility result is that of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these 
impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind), which shows that 
any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One interpretation of the 
result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just logic) are available to the 
players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs that the players can write 
down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. But note W’s characterization of 
‘thinking’ as a potential action with COS, which says they don’t really have a 
meaning (use), like Chaitin’s infinity of apparently well-formed formulas that do 
not actually belong to our system of mathematics. “Ann believes that Bob assumes 
that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and 
multiple layers of ‘recursion’ (another LG) have been assumed in argumentation, 
linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but B&K showed that it is 
impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing 
body of such impossibility results for one person or multiplayer decision situations 
(e.g., they grade into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc.). For a good technical 
paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s 
paper from arXiv which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as 
its title notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) 
and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote 
Yanofsky’s (Y’s) paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and 
fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386,2003. 
 
Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum 
computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift 
to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations’(2013). For maybe 
the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p 
powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles 
and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see 
’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
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One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits 
to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device 
doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply 
across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he summarized thusly: 
“One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly processing 
information faster than the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot 
exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be 
an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They 
also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published 
what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) 
which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has 
published various versions of these proofs over two decades in some of the most 
prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as 
well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major science journals, few 
seem to have noticed, and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, 
decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
W’s prescient grasp of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism and 
paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer science 
(though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently suggested the 
necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. “Any mathematical 
theory presented in first order logic has a finite paraconsistent model.” Berto 
continues: “Of course strict finitism and the insistence on the decidability of any 
meaningful mathematical question go hand in hand. As Rodych has remarked, the 
intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is dominated by his ‘finitism and his view […] of 
mathematical meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to which 
‘[only] finite logical sums and products (containing only decidable arithmetic 
predicates) are meaningful because they are algorithmically decidable.’”. In modern 
terms this means they have public conditions of satisfaction (COS)-i.e., can be stated 
as a proposition that is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view that ultimately 
everything in math and logic rests on our innate (though of course extensible) 
ability to recognize a valid proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve 
(i.e., the working mathematician’s) notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of 
decidability meant to him simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein 
believed that everything had to be decidable in mathematics…Of course one can 
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speak against the decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s 
results themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both 
Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the 
notion of proof and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that 
the naïve notion of proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of 
consistency, which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument 
call into question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the consistency of the 
relevant system is precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s First 
Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that its 
non-triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too—
including its own predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory” [As Graham 
Priest noted over 20 years ago]. 
 
This brings to mind W’s famous comment. 
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is 
its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about 
the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of mathematics, 
but something for philosophical treatment.” PI 234 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in 
common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is totally 
current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has considered 
these matters.  The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to mind. His Godel, 
Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book Award for Science, sold 
millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 400 mostly 5 star 
reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real issues and repeats the 
classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. His subsequent philosophical 
writings have not improved (he has chosen Dennett as his muse), but, as these views 
are vacuous and unconnected to real life, he continues to do excellent science. 
 
Once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have meaning 
in specific human contexts— that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all observer 
relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from our 
psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. 
Only in our language games do our laptop or the universe compute. 
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W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem becomes 
a philosophical one, i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. Virtually all 
scientists and most philosophers, do not get that there are two distinct kinds of 
“questions” or “assertions” (both families of Language Games). There are those that 
are matters of fact about how the world is—that is, they are publicly observable 
propositional (True or False ) states of affairs having clear meanings (COS)—i.e., 
scientific statements, and then there are those that are issues about how language 
can coherently be used to describe these states of affairs, and these can be answered 
by any sane, intelligent, literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science, 
though of course there are borderline cases where we have to decide. Another 
poorly understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, 
inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true 
or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star shows a 
red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing that the 
symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by the fast, 
automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which 
there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions 
in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives its inputs from S1). 
 
This two systems approach is now a standard way to view reasoning or rationality 
and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of which science and math 
are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing literature on reasoning that 
is indispensable to the study of behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the 
details of how we actually reason (i.e., use language to carry out actions—see W 
and S) is ‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van 
Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of 
W/S and the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of early 2015) the best 
single source I know. There are endless books and papers on reasoning, decision 
theory, game theory etc. and many variants of and some alternatives to the two 
systems framework, but I am one of a rapidly increasing number who find the 
simple S1/S2 framework the best one for most situations. The best recent book on 
reason from the dual systems approach is Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind 
(2014) edited by Sherman et al. and Manktelow et al ‘The Science of Reason’ (2011) 
is also indispensable. 
 
What is only now coming to the fore, after millennia of discussion of reasoning in 
philosophy, psychology, logic, math, economics, sociology etc., is the study of the 
actual way in which we use words like and,’ but, or, means, signifies, implies, not’, 
 12 
 
and above all ‘if’ (the conditional being the subject of over 50 papers and a book 
(‘IF’) by Evans, one of the leading researchers in this arena. Of course, Wittgenstein 
understood the basic issues here, likely better than anyone to this day, and laid out 
the facts beginning most clearly with the Blue and Brown Books starting in the 30’s 
and ending with the superb ‘On Certainty’ (which can be viewed as a dissertation 
on what are now called  the two systems of thought), but sadly most students of 
behavior don’t have a clue about his work. 
 
Yanofsky’s book (The Outer Limits of Reason) is an extended treatment of these 
issues, but with little philosophical insight. He says math is free of contradictions, 
yet as noted, it has been well known for over half a century that logic and math are 
full of them—just google inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the 
works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we 
follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s suggestion to avoid incompleteness. In any 
event, paraconsistency is now a common feature and a major research program in 
geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and computer science. Y on p346 
says reason must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” has different 
uses and they arise frequently in everyday life, but we have innate mechanisms to 
contain them. This is true because it was the case in our everyday life long before 
math and science. Until very recently only W saw that it was unavoidable that our 
life and all our symbolic systems are paraconsistent and that we get along just fine 
as we have mechanisms for encapsulating or avoiding it. W tried to explain this to 
Turing in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics, given at Cambridge at the 
same time as Turing’s course on the same topic. 
 
Now I will make a few comments on specific items in the book. As noted on p13, 
Rice’s Theorem shows the impossibility of a universal antivirus for computers (and 
perhaps for living organisms as well) and so is, like Turing’s Halting theorem, 
another alternative statement of Godel’s Theorems, but unlike Turing’s, it is rarely 
mentioned. 
 
On p33 the discussion of the relation of compressibility, structure, randomness etc. 
is much better stated in Chaitin’s many other books and papers. Also of 
fundamental importance is the comment by Weyl on the fact that one can ‘prove’ 
or ‘derive’ anything from anything else if one permits arbitrarily ‘complex’ 
‘equations’ (with arbitrary ‘constants’) but there is little awareness of this among 
scientists or philosophers. As W said we need to look at the role which any 
statement, equation, logical or mathematical proof plays in our life in order to 
discern its meaning since there is no limit on what we can write, say or ‘prove’, but 
 13 
 
only a tiny subset of these has a use. ‘Chaos’, ‘complexity’, ‘law’, ‘structure’, 
‘theorem’, ‘equation’, ‘proof’, ‘result’, ‘randomness’, ‘compressibility’ etc.are all 
families of language games with meanings (COS) that vary greatly, and one must 
look at their precise role in the given context. This is rarely done in any systematic 
deliberate way, with disastrous results. As Searle notes repeatedly, these words 
have intrinsic intentionality only relevant to human action and quite different 
(ascribed) meanings otherwise. It is only ascribed intentionality derived from our 
psychology when we say that a thermometer ‘tells’ the temperature or a computer 
is ‘computing’ or an equation is a ‘proof’. 
 
As is typical in scientific discussion of these topics, the comments on p36 (on omega 
and quasi-empirical mathematics) and in much of the book cross the line between 
science and philosophy. Although there is a large literature on the philosophy of 
mathematics, so far asI know, there is still no better analysis than that of W’s, not 
only in his comments published as ‘Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics’ 
and ‘Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics’, but throughout the 20,000 pages 
of his nachlass (awaiting a new edition on CDROM from OUP ca. 2020 but much 
online now -see e.g., Pichler 
http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Math, like logic, 
language, art, artefacts and music only have a meaning (use or COS in a context) 
when connected to life by words or practices. 
 
Likewise, on p54 et seq. it was W who has given us the first and best rationale for 
paraconsistency, long before anyone actually worked out a paraconsistent logic. 
Again, as W pointed out many times, it is critical to be aware that not everything is 
a ‘problem’, ‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘proof’ or a ‘solution’ in the same sense and 
accepting something as one or the other commits one to an often confused point of 
view. 
 
In the discussion of physics on p108-9 we must remind ourselves that ‘point’, 
‘energy’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘infinite’, ‘beginning’, ‘end’, ‘particle’, ’wave’, ‘quantum’ 
etc. are all typical language games that seduce us into incoherent views of how 
things are by applying meanings (COS) from one game to a quite different one. 
 
So, this book is a flawed diamond with much value, and I hope the authors are able 
to revise and enlarge it. It makes the nearly universal and fatal mistake of regarding 
science, especially mathematics, logic and physics, as though they were systems—
i.e., domains where “number”, “space”, “time”, “proof”, “event”, “point”, “occurs”, 
“force”, “formula” etc. can be used throughout its “processes” and “states” without 
changes in meaning—i.e., without altering the Conditions of Satisfaction, which are 
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publicly observable tests of truth or falsity. And when it’s an almost insuperable 
problem for such truly clever and experienced people as the authors, what chance 
do the rest of us have? Let us recall W’s comment on this fatal mistake. 
 
“The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and 
states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more 
about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of 
looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to 
know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been 
made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)” PI p308 
 
While writing this article I came upon Dennett’s infamous ‘damning with faint 
praise’ summary of W’s importance, which he was asked to write when Time 
Magazine, with amazing perspicacity, choose Wittgenstein as one of the 100 most 
important people of the 20th century. As with his other writings, it shows his 
complete failure to grasp the nature of W’s work (i.e., of philosophy) and reminds 
me of another famous W comment that is pertinent here. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say--- is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
Chaitin is an American and his many books and articles are well known and easy 
to find, but Da Costa (who is 89) and Doria (79) are Brazilians and most of Da 
Costa’s work is only in Portuguese, but Doria has many items in English. You can 
find a partial bibliography for Doria here 
http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html and of course 
see their Wikis. 
 
The best collections of their work are in Chaos, Computers, Games and Time: A 
quarter century of joint work with Newton da Costa by F. Doria 132p(2011), On the 
Foundations of Science by da Costa and Doria 294p(2008), and Metamathematics of 
science by da Costa and Doria 216p(1997), but they were published in Brazil and 
almost impossible to find. You will likely have to get them through interlibrary loan 
or as digital files from the authors, but as always try libgen.io and b-ok.org. 
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There is a nice Festschrift in honor of Newton C.A. Da Costa on the occasion of his 
seventieth birthday edited by Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco Antonio 
Doria. (2000) which is an issue of Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1-2 (2000), also 
published as a book, but the book is in only 5 libraries worldwide and not on 
Amazon. 
 
See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social Sciences: 
The Significance Of Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and Wuppuluri 
and Doria (Eds.), "The Map and the Territory: Exploring the foundations of science, 
thought and reality" (2018). 
 
Another relevant item is New trends in the foundations of science : papers 
dedicated to the 80th birthday of Patrick Suppes, presented in Florianópolis, Brazil, 
April 22-23, 2002 by Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; Newton C da 
Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), which is vol. 154 # 3 of 
Synthese, but again the book is in only 2 libraries and not on Amazon. 
 
Brazilian studies in philosophy and history of science: an account of recent works 
by Decio Krause; Anto ̂nio Augusto Passos Videira; has one article by each of them 
and is an expensive book but cheap on Kindle. Though it is a decade old, some may 
be interested in “Are the Foundations of Computer Science Logic-dependent?” by 
Carnielli and Doria, which says that Turing Machine Theory (TMT) can be seen as 
‘arithmetic in disguise’, in particular as the theory of Diophantine Equations in 
which they formalize it, and conclude that ‘Axiomatized Computer Science is Logic-
Dependent’. Of course, as Wittgensteinians, we want to look very carefully at the 
language games (or math games), i.e., the precise Conditions of Satisfaction 
(truthmakers) resulting from using each of these words (i.e., ‘axiomatized’, 
‘computer science’, and ‘logic- dependent’). Carnielli and Agudello also formalize 
TMT in terms of paraconsistent logic, creating a model for paraconsistent Turing 
Machines (PTM’s) which has similarities to quantum computing and so with a 
quantic interpretation of it they create a Quantum Turing Machine model with 
which they solve the Deutsch and Deutsch-Jozsa problems. 
 
This permits contradictory instructions to be simultaneously executed and stored 
and each tape cell, when and if halting occurs, may have multiple symbols, each of 
which represents an output, thus permitting control of unicity versus multiplicity 
conditions, which simulate quantum algorithms, preserving efficiency. 
 
Doria and Da Costa also proved (1991) that chaos theory is undecidable, and when 
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properly axiomatized within classical set theory, is incomplete in Gödel’s sense. 
 
The articles, and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et 
al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through computation’ (2011) is a 
stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but again lacking awareness of 
the philosophical issues, and so often missing the point. Chaitin also contributes to 
‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied Cognition’ (2010), replete with 
articles having the usual mixture of scientific insight and philosophical incoherence, 
and as usual nobody is aware that Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) provided deep and 
unsurpassed insights into the issues over half a century ago, including Embodied 
Cognition (Enactivism). 
 
Finally, I would like to mention the work of physicist/philosopher Nancy 
Cartwright whose writings on the meaning of natural ‘laws’ and ‘causation’ are 
indispensable to anyone interested in these topics. 
 
 
